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Freedom. Your Right. Our Responsibility.
- Current slogan of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines
T
he Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) as an institution is tasked to de-
fend the country against internal and
external threats. The organization
takes pride in fulfilling its role as the “guardian
of democracy” and “protector of the people and
the state” against forces that threaten the
people’s freedom. But how does the AFP do
this role? How does it respond as an institution
to the armed conflict between the government
and its enemies?
This Notes looks at the various operation plans
or OPLANS that the military designed and
implemented against the Communist Party of
the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA),
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) under the
presidencies of Ferdinand Marcos, Corazon
Aquino, Fidel V. Ramos, Joseph Estrada and
currently, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It analyzes
the peace policies of the government using as
a framework the study of a senior United Na-
tions Development Programme (UNDP) official1
and assesses the military’s institutional re-
sponses to the armed conflict—where they
failed, where they succeeded, and why. It also
makes recommendations for policy intervention
to enhance the process for sustainable peace,
______________
1 Paper entitled “Mindanao and beyond: competing poli-
cies, protracted conflict and human security” (2002) writ-
ten by Dr. Paul Oquist, UNDP Senior Regional Governance
Adviser for Asia and Coordinator of the UNDP Paragon
Regional Governance Programme for Asia.PN 2006-02
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human security, and human development in the
Philippines.
Framework for analysis
In his paper written in 2002, UNDP’s Dr. Paul
Oquist observed that the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines (GRP) has used three
competing policy positions in trying to address
the armed conflict, which partly explains the
extreme protraction of the peace process in
Mindanao.
These three policy positions are:
Pacification position – seeks a cessation of hos-
tilities while making as few concessions as pos-
sible. The results are usually short-term and do
not sufficiently address the root causes of armed
conflicts since none of the actors have the po-
litical will/capacity to solve the causes and
construct long-term peace.
Victory position – seeks the immediate end of
armed conflicts and the defeat of insurgency
groups. This is usually accompanied by large-
scale military operations that use highly repres-
sive tactics that violate human rights. It is able
to make small insurgencies large and pro-
tracted, and is self-destructive.
Institutional position – advocates the adoption
and implementation of policies necessary to
achieve sustainable, long-term peace and the
articulation of institutions to implement and
consolidate these policies.
The AFP’s institutional responses
The government’s responses to the armed con-
flict has been a compromise between civilian
and military interpretations and perception of
armed threats and how best to respond to them.
This tension between civilian and military au-
thorities is reflected in the mix of government
and military responses to these threats as seen
in the right hand and left hand approaches to
counterinsurgency from the 1950s onwards.
The balance between the right hand (primarily
the use of military force) and left hand (socio-
economic and political measures to address
root causes and win hearts and minds of the
people) tilted in favor of one side, depending
on the overall political, economic, social, and
environmental context, the strategic situation
on the ground, and on the personality and
policy preferences of political and military lead-
ers. It does not help that the military is gener-
ally averse to peace agreements and amnesty
for insurgents because of the loss of military
lives and the personal sacrifices of soldiers to
make the country safe against its enemies. From
the perspective of the men and women in uni-
form in general, armed conflicts should be
settled first before national development could
prosper.
The series of operational plans implemented
by the military from the time of the Marcos dic-
tatorship to the present reflects this view.
OPLANS of the AFP
Marcos regime: martial law era
When Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law
in 1972, he needed the military to rule the coun-
try. He then expanded the AFP’s role in society
and politics by making it a partner in national
development. Military officers were trained in
various social science fields like public admin-
istration and business management to prepare
them to manage society and government—a
task they performed during martial law. Marcos
The government’s responses to the armed conflict has
been a compromise between civilian and military
interpretations and perception of armed threats and
how best to respond to them. This tension between
civilian and military authorities is reflected in the




also put all the uniformed services under his
control through the AFP Chief of Staff: the Army,
Air Force, Navy, and the Constabulary-Inte-
grated National Police.
It was during this period that the growth of the
communist insurgency and Muslim separatism
was nurtured. From about 1,100 in 1971 with
an armed component of 310, the CPP-NPA
grew to 7,200 members with a mass base of
480,000 by 1983. On the other hand, Nur
Misuari’s MNLF and Bangsa Moro Army num-
bered about 16,700 in 1973. By the mid-1970s,
however, the MNLF has become the biggest
threat to national security. Attacks were made
in Marawi City shortly after martial law was
declared and Muslim separatism spread to other
parts of the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan region. By
1975, 75 percent of AFP troops were deployed
in Mindanao and the AFP’s budget increased
by 700 percent from P518 million in 1972 to
P3.5 billion in 1976.
In response to the MNLF threat, OPLAN Bagong
Buhay, a 5-year phase strategy combining the
victory and institutional positions was adopted.
Under the plan, the military conducted offen-
sive operations against the MNLF while civil-
ian agencies sought to reestablish civil author-
ity by restructuring local governments, reopen-
ing schools, strengthening the police forces, and
reconstructing recovered infrastructure facili-
ties to uplift the economic condition of the
people.
The toll on human lives and property was heavy
on both sides. Independent estimates came out
with these numbers: 50,000 deaths, 2 million
refugees, 200,000 houses burned, 535 mosques
and 200 schools demolished, and 35 cities and
towns destroyed. Still, the military operations
managed to reduce the MNLF forces from
16,900 to 6,900 in 1976. As a result, the MNLF
was forced to the negotiation table. Thus, the
victory position enabled the achievement of the
pacification goal of a peace agreement. How-
ever, the conflicting policy positions were ulti-
mately unsuccessful: the triumph of military
might (victory position) was short-lived and the
failure in the implementation of the institutional
position enabled the Muslim separatist move-
ment to persist and outlive martial law.
In the same manner, the institutional response
to the CPP-NPA consisted of the right hand (vic-
tory position) and left hand (institutional posi-
tion) approaches. The military conducted op-
erations that led to the communists’ loss of more
than 10,000 combatants, the capture of almost
2,000 leaders, and recovery of more than 2,000
firearms. At the same time, the AFP’s Home
Defense Program carried out literacy projects
and livelihood programs that benefited 246,000
people from 1973-1978. These programs even-
tually led to a radical decline in the NPA’s mass
base—from 65,000 to 20,000 during that pe-
riod. Clearly, an indication of the institutional
position’s advantage over the victory and paci-
fication positions.
While the right hand and left hand tactic
worked for a brief period, the insurgency was
not resolved and eventually resurged and
spread to other parts of Luzon, in particular,
the Bicol region, Visayas, and some parts of
Mindanao. Because of this, OPLAN Katatagan
was adopted in 1981. It was implemented in
four stages: clearing, holding, consolidation,
and development of areas recovered from in-
surgents. It also involved the police, paramili-
...The conflicting policy positions were ultimately
unsuccessful: the triumph of military might (victory
position) was short-lived and the failure in the
implementation of the institutional position enabled
the Muslim separatist movement to persist and
outlive martial law.PN 2006-02
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tary forces through the strengthened Civil Home
Defense Forces (CHDF), civilian voluntary or-
ganizations, and local development agencies
in achieving the security-development design
of the plan. Though correctly premised on the
fact that the insurgency is caused by social in-
equalities and other ills in society, OPLAN
Katatagan’s goal, however, was still to defend
the state instead of securing and caring for the
people. There were also problems of ineffi-
ciency as the use of AFP resources was not
maximized and there was a lack of apprecia-
tion of the root causes of the insurgency prob-
lem. Thus, the military’s conflicting policies in
dealing with the communist insurgency, like the
Muslim separatism, survived the Marcos re-
gime.
Aquino administration: 1986-1992
With the entry of Corazon Aquino’s adminis-
tration, there was an initial attempt to restore
the pre-martial law balance of power between
the civilian authority and the military. Its prin-
cipal policy in relation to armed conflict was
one of reconciliation with justice. In April 1986,
therefore, the AFP replaced OPLAN Katatagan
with OPLAN Mamamayan. Instead of protect-
ing the security of the state, Mamamayan fo-
cused on protecting the people. It also added
the new administration’s mantra of national
reconciliation with justice. But because the
defense and military establishment opposed the
policy and sought a tougher stance against the
communist insurgency and Muslim separatists,
a counterinsurgency strategy was formulated
that basically retained the right hand and left
hand approaches of the past. The victory posi-
tion was reflected in the establishment of Spe-
cial Operations Teams (SOTs) that had three
teams undertaking psychological, security, and
“stay-behind” operations. The psy-ops team
sought to discover guerilla political organiza-
tions and structure, the security team handled
the safety of captured rebels while the third
team took care of barangay defense. The re-
constituted Civilian Armed Forces Geographi-
cal Units (CAFGUs), the successor to the CHDF
during martial law, also bolstered the military
capacity. On the other hand, Mamamayan also
encouraged rebels to return to the fold of the
law together with their firearms and instituted
rehabilitation programs for the surrenderees. In
exchange, they were extended loans to start a
new life. These goals represented the institu-
tional policy position.
In the end, Mamamayan also failed to solve
the communist insurgency and was replaced
by OPLAN Lambat Bitag in September 1988. A
further refinement of its predecessors, Lambat
Bitag’s long-term goal was to end the insurgency
by addressing its political, economic, and so-
cial causes. But its immediate aim was to “slash
its growth through military means” which dem-
onstrates the “unsheathing of the sword of war,”
a sign of the influence of the military in Aquino’s
policy regarding the insurgency.
The two goals also indicate the continuing in-
coherent policy of the military in response to
armed conflict. While Lambat Bitag’s guidelines
included waging a war of rapid conclusion by
prioritizing and destroying guerilla fronts
through simultaneous military offensives coun-
trywide, it also invoked the strict observance
of human rights, abiding with the national rec-
onciliation policy, involving civic and local
government officials and mobilizing various
sectors like labor, peasantry, clergy, media, etc.
With the entry of Corazon Aquino’s administration,
there was an initial attempt to restore the pre-martial
law balance of power between the civilian authority
and the military. Its principal policy in relation to
armed conflict was one of reconciliation with justice.
In April 1986, therefore, the AFP replaced OPLAN
Katatagan with OPLAN Mamamayan.PN 2006-02
5
Policy Notes
The plan was more successful than
Mamamayan as it managed to diminish the
communist strength from 25,200 in 1987 to
14,800 in 1991. Rebel firearms were likewise
cut from 12,060 in 1989 to 10,510 in 1991.
Similar reductions were also noted in infiltrated
barangays and guerilla fronts. Furthermore,
seven high-ranking communist leaders were
captured in 1988 including CPP-NPA secretary-
general Rafael Baylosis and NPA chief Romulo
Kintanar. In spite of this, the communist insur-
gency survived.
Ramos administration: 1992-1998
When Fidel V. Ramos assumed the presidency,
his policy was to forge peace agreements with
all armed groups. Aware of the importance of
having an enabling environment for economic
recovery and growth, he pursued the policy of
national reconciliation and set up the mecha-
nisms that led to the adoption of the National
Program for Unification and Development in
1994 which offered amnesty to the leftists, sepa-
ratists, and rightists. The peace strategy under
Ramos consisted primarily of economic, politi-
cal and social reforms, consensus building, and
negotiations with the rebels. This represented
the institutional position.
Significantly, the government also repealed R.A.
1700, the Anti-subversion Law, paving the way
for the former subversive groups to pursue their
political and social goals through parliamen-
tary rather than armed struggle. The peace talks
with the CPP-NPA, however, did not go far be-
cause of the left’s insistence of being accorded
the status of parity with the GRP.
Lambat Bitag remained in force. But gains were
made in the Balik-Baril program which encour-
aged rebels to surrender their firearms in ex-
change for seed money to start a livelihood
program. The success of this program further
diminished the mass base of the communist
insurgency as the number of infiltrated
barangays dropped from 8,496 in 1988 to just
984 by 1993. Further reduction in the coming
years enabled the government to scale down
the AFP’s role in counterinsurgency to a sup-
porting role while the internal security task was
transferred to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) except in Mindanao, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi,
Bicol Region, southeastern Quezon, and the
Cordillera Administrative Region. Having
learned from the Marcos regime, civil-military
operations during the Ramos presidency were
more holistic and developmental in nature as
they became integrated into the Social Reform
Agenda. As a result, 236 Muslim rebels surren-
dered and gave up 188 firearms in 1998.
The road to peace that started in 1986 has been
rocky but some achievements were still made.
The peace talks with the MNLF eventually led
to a ceasefire and the signing of a peace agree-
ment in September 1996. The Southern Philip-
pines Council for Peace and Development
(SPCPD) was established, selected Bangsa Moro
Army members were integrated into the AFP
and Nur Misuari was elected Governor of the
ARMM and Chair of the SPCPD. The splinter
group, MILF, also engaged in peace talks with
the GRP in 1997.
Estrada administration: 1998-2001
The gains made in the peace negotiations with
Muslim secessionists, however, were drastically
affected with Joseph Estrada’s mailed fist policy.
When Fidel V. Ramos assumed the presidency, his
policy was to forge peace agreements with all armed
groups. Aware of the importance of having an
enabling environment for economic recovery and
growth, he pursued the policy of national
reconciliation and set up the mechanisms...The peace
strategy consisted primarily of economic, political and
social reforms, consensus building, and negotiations
with the rebels.PN 2006-02
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After the MILF rejected his ultimatum for a
peace agreement, Estrada, with the advice and
support of the military, declared an “all-out war”
against the MILF in Central Mindanao in April
2000. This signaled a distinct policy shift from
Ramos’s negotiated settlement, a policy much
influenced by the AFP leadership. Meanwhile,
peace talks with the communist insurgents
stalled due to the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA), to which the NDF objected. Aware of
the split within the communist movement,
Estrada sought peace talks with the communist
factions opposing the NDF. In the end, Estrada’s
three-year term was marked by an increase in
strength of both the communist insurgency and
Muslim secessionism. His administration’s fail-
ure to address the root causes of the armed
conflict and focus on the victory position helped
keep the armed conflict alive.
Macapagal-Arroyo administration: 2001
to present
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s administration has
pursued a negotiated settlement both with the
communist insurgents and Muslim separatists:
in 2002, the military launched OPLAN Bantay
Laya, a five-year counterinsurgency program
involving both the military and civilian agen-
cies of the government. Its strategic goal “is to
decisively defeat the insurgents’ armed groups
in order to obtain and maintain peace for na-
tional development.” This goal reflects the vic-
tory and institutional positions, with the logic
that victory is necessary for national develop-
ment to take place.
Bantay Laya is based on the National Internal
Security Plan (NISP) formulated by the Depart-
ment of National Defense (DND) and devel-
oped and adopted by the AFP. The immediate
goal of the plan is to defeat the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG), stop the growth of the CPP-NPA,
and contain the Southern Philippines Separat-
ist Groups (SPSG referring to the MNLF, the
Misuari Breakaway Group, and the MILF). It
also aims to reduce the CPP-NPA affected ar-
eas, manpower, and firearms and to degrade
the capability of the SPSGs. Among its long-
term goals are to prevent the resurgence of the
ASG, resolve the CPP-NPA threat, and compel
the SPSGs to renounce their separatist objec-
tive.
Bantay Laya’s operational principle consists of
clear, hold, and support methodology. The clear
phase involves the conduct of combat, intelli-
gence, and psychological (the so-called triad
concept) operations to militarily defeat the in-
surgents. The hold phase entails limiting the
movement, resources, and mass base support
of the insurgents and preventing their incursion
in the barangays to protect the people, defend
communities, and secure vital installations. The
support phase is divided into subphases where
consolidation and development activities
would be undertaken by civilian agencies. In
the past OPLANs, the military found itself per-
forming the development responsibilities of ci-
vilian agencies for which the AFP had no train-
ing. With Bantay Laya’s modified methodology,
the AFP’s role is to strengthen government con-
trol over contested barangays, help develop
LGUs’ capability during consolidation, and play
a supportive role to civilian agencies during
development subphases.
The Bantay Laya pursues the institutional policy
position premised on a prior attainment of vic-
tory against the insurgents. The continuing lack
of policy coherence explains the prevailing
uncertain state of the peace process with the
NDF and MILF. Consequently, this policy in-
coherence also led to the persistence of “a dis-
tant peace” for the country.
Toward a policy coherence in the
peace process
The failure of the succession of operational
plans against the communist insurgency and
Muslim secessionism since the Marcos admin-PN 2006-02
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istration could be traced to the lack of policy
coherence. The jumbled mixture of pacifica-
tion, victory, and institutional positions is mani-
fested in the failure of the various agencies that
are supposed to implement components of the
plans to coordinate their activities. In many
instances, the civilian agencies had relied too
much on the AFP to carry out their assigned
tasks. Moreover, the actors that signed the peace
agreement were not the same ones who funded
and implemented it. In the same vein, the imple-
mentation of the right hand and left hand ap-
proach did not have the necessary coordina-
tion between the military and civilians to en-
sure effectiveness. Both the military and civil-
ian actors have their own framework, language,
and statistics. The military continued to view
insurgents as “enemies” or “pests” while the
civilian agencies were lax in taking over from
the military of their supposed tasks.
The current Bantay Laya plan is supposed to
address some of these problems. It identified
the responsibilities of the DND/AFP, the De-
partment of Interior and Local Government
(DILG)/PNP, and the main civilian government
agencies in charge of implementing the vari-
ous phases of the plan. Furthermore, the Ar-
royo administration established a National Task
Force on Convergence Strategy to develop and
adopt a common framework and language for
the peace process to harmonize the right and
left hand approaches in dealing with the armed
conflict. This common framework could resolve
the problem of policy incoherence. However,
there is a need to develop a culture of peace
among the stakeholders, starting with the mili-
tary whose mindset has been traditionally set
by its mission.
Recommendations
z In order to avoid policy incoherence, the
government must have a clear choice of which
option to take. Since pacification and victory
positions have clearly failed judging from the
continuing armed conflict, the preferred option
would be institutional policy because it ad-
dresses the root causes of the conflict, is holis-
tic and inclusive of stakeholders, and puts a
high value on institutions and processes.
z The government must adopt a human se-
curity framework as a necessary component of
its policy to redress armed conflict rather than
adopting a state or regime security approach.
z Those who negotiate and forge peace
agreements should also finance and implement
them in order to achieve the need for consis-
tency. The peace process should also be under
a civilian leader with integrity, probity, inde-
pendence, and competence and someone who
can mobilize all sectors behind the peace pro-
cess.
z The government must undertake measures
that would make it harder to gain from armed
conflict. Some established groups might be prof-
iting from the conflict and would not genuinely
seek its resolution.
z There is a need for greater civil society in-
volvement in the peace process. They can serve
as independent and nonpartisan monitors to
ensure that the process is on track and provide
timely and accurate information about the situ-
ation on the ground.
z All stakeholders should support the efforts
and output of the National Task Force on Con-
The failure of the succession of operational plans
against the communist insurgency and Muslim
secessionism since the Marcos administration could
be traced to the lack of policy coherence. The jumbled
mixture of pacification, victory, and institutional
positions is manifested in the failure of the various
agencies that are supposed to implement components
of the plans to coordinate their activities.PN 2006-02
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vergence Strategy. The Task Force seeks to har-
monize the right and left hand approaches to
armed conflicts and craft a common framework
among the stakeholders in and out of govern-
ment and in the military.
z The military needs to be more effectively
subordinated to civilian authority so that its
members do not undermine the policy option
chosen by the government. In addition, the
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military must swiftly and effectively impose
penalty for military insubordination.
z Finally, politicians and other civilian lead-
ers need to understand the dynamics and con-
text of the institutionalization of the supremacy
of civilian authority. Oversight functions must
ensure that the institution that they seek to sub-
ordinate does not get destroyed in the process.

New book
Financial liberalization: managing risks and opportunities
edited by Ponciano S. Intal Jr.
This volume, which is co-published with the Philippine APEC Study Center Network
(PASCN), is a collection of seven studies that focus on interrelated aspects of the structural
and institutional foundations of effective risk management and exploitation of opportunities
in an open economy. It also draws lessons from and insights on macroeconomic management
in an open economy; the liberalization of the banking industry; the human resource
implications of financial liberalization and integration; and the behavior of APEC member-
economies toward the financial services agreement under the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS).
2005. 388 pages. 6" x 9". PhP950.00. ISBN 971-564-081-8